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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH BRIEF OF APPEAL 
Plaintiff/Appellee, : 
vs. : Case No. 960059-ca 
Frank Parker : 
Defendant/Appellant : 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF T ¥ E PROCEEDING 
Appeal from a forfeiture, pursuant to, Utah Code Ann. 58-37-13(1), The derivative from the 
Appellant violation of Utah Code Ann. 58-37-8. Thereafter a bargain to "conditional" guilty plea. 
Utah Code Ann.58-37-8 a felony of the third degree. 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE AND STANDARD OF APPELLATE REVIEW 
Did the trial court violate the United State Constitutional Amendment VIII "Excessive bail 
shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted?" 
Citing; United States vs. Halper. 490 U.S. 435, 109 S.Ct (1892)(1989); Utah Constitution 
Amend. Article, I Section 9. Secondly, did the trial court violate the Appellant fifth amendment 
Double Jeopardy Rights. In concluding that the criminal action and the forfeiture action were 
separate proceedings, separate times, separate judges, but litigated the exact same facts. Established; 
United States vs. S405.089.23 U.S. Currency. 33 f.3d 1210,1216 (9th cir. 1994). 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On November 21,1994, appellant/Frank Parker was arrested by the Murray City Police for 
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possession of a controlled substance with the intent to distribute. Resulting from the arrest, the 
Appellant property was seized (see Appendix for full description of property). Murray City police 
were contacted by an individual "Johnny Emery Blanchard" who stated he had brought some cocaine 
from the appellant. He stated that he had given the appellant permission to use his vehicle until he 
could get money for the cocaine. John Emery Blanchard then contacted the appellant by pager, 
requesting that the appellant meet him at the 7-eleven at 4811 South State to buy more drugs. 
Murray police were awaiting the Appellant arrival. When appellant arrived officers approached the 
appellant, thereafter Johnny Emery Blanchard departed from the Appellant vehicle. "No transaction 
took place between Johnny Emery Blanchard and the appellant." Handcuffs were placed on the 
appellant for the officer's safety. The appellant did not consent to the officers request to search the 
vehicle. However, the officer could see an open container of beer on the passenger floor board of 
the Appellant vehicle. Under the probable cause statute the officer searched the Appellant vehicle, 
finding on the passenger floor board of the vehicle one small pouch with individual badges of a 
white powdery substance believed to be cocaine. A female who was accompanying the appellant 
was inside the 7-eleven, thereafter, being made aware of the situation by a clerk working at the 7-
eleven. The officers then apprehended the female, and during a pat search the officer found a pipe 
and baking soda that were believed to be drug paraphernalia. The female was transported to the 
Murray Police Department where she confessed that the drugs were the property of the appellant, 
in exchange for her release and further complication with the law. The controlled substance was 
booked into evidence at the Murray Police Station and the appellant was booked into the Salt Lake 
County Jail. 
POINT I 
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"Did the trial court violate the United State Constitutional Amendment 
VIII,ff Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor 
cruel and unusual punishments inflicted?" 
The appellant argues, consciously that the trial court tried to act moderately, but in the 
contrary, awarding forfeiture to the state was arbitrary, and violates the Constitution of Utah 
Article I, section 9; United States Constitution Amendment VIII [Excessive Fines 
Imposement]. The appellant asserts that once a particular controversy has been finally decided in 
a legal proceeding it's unconstitutional to be reopened and if so, would fall under an issue of Law 
defined as Breach of Contact. Thereafter the appellant has entered a conditional plea agreement for 
all charges filed against him, and all charges were known to the prosecution at the time of such pleas. 
Thereafter, the appellant being convicted resulting from the State pursuant to, Utah Code Ann. 58-
37-8 unlawful possession of a controlled substance (cocaine) a felony of the third degree, the 
"Honorable: R. A. Livingston." pronounced his adjudicative decision, confining the appellant to 
imprisonment at the Utah State Prison for an indeterminate period of 0 to 5 years. Thereafter, the 
adjudicative decision, the appellant asserted for the records of the trials court and to act upon 
as a condition of the plea bargain "sir, since the appellant has.... can the appellant get his 
substances back that's being held by the Murray Police Department. Judge Livingston; 
ff
 jokingly1 f Mr. Parker I see no need for the prosecution to hold your substance any longer, but 
I am sure that you know that you cannot get the controlled substance back." The Appellant 
argument is that, at this time if the prosecution had a rebuttal against the appellant retrieving his 
property back or, if the prosecution intentions were to forego civil charges against the appellant 
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pursuant to Utah Code Ann. 58-37-13(1) "Forfeiture" it should have been alighted at that time. The 
prosecution failed to enjoin the forsaid issue at the appropriate time. I n reference the appellant 
turned the court attention to ; Utah Code Ann, 76-402,2(2). 
If another suit derives attempting to litigate the same allegation and facts would be met by 
the plea of "res adjudicata,". The appellant further states, that forfeiture of the Appellant vehicle 
would fall under [excessive fines]. "The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the excessive fine 
clause does apply to civil in rem forfeiture. Austin—U.S.—at—,113, S.Ct. at 2812. As an essential 
predicate to this holding the court concluded that the eighth amendment prohibits including the 
prohibition against excessive fines, apply in both criminal and civil contexts Id.—at—. 113 S. Ct. 
at 2804-06 according to the court, the question is not whether the forfeiture is civil or criminal, but 
whether the forfeiture constitutes punishment, Id.—at—113 S.Ct. at 2806." The prosecution asserted 
that Appellant "vehicle," even though it's clear of all liens, forfeiture does not constitute punishment, 
because the Appellant vehicle does not exceed the costs of prosecution. The appellant asserts that 
forfeiture of his vehicle would constitute punishment, when considering the appellant poverty 
deficiencies, (see Appendix Titled Source of income), and turns the court's attention to; Cf. Austin. 
113 S.Ct. at 2812 N.14; 
"Forfeiture of a valuable automobile would constitute punishment in many 
situations where the vehicle value greatly exceeded the costs of the 
prosecution. But the poor person's loss of his only "wheels" may actually 
work much more of a hardship than the wealthy person's loss of a 
luxury automobile. Surely the availability of important constitutional 
protections cannot turn on such vagaries of economics." 
Id. (T)he value of the conveyances...forfeiture... can vary so dramatically that any relationship 
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between the government's actual costs and the amount of the sanction is merely coincidental." 
Thereafter the appellant asserts after having been sentenced to the Utah State Prison for the 
indeterminate period of, 0 to 5 years. The appellant opposed the forfeiture because it would be 
unduly harsh and violate the eighth amendment. 
"Stare Decisis-"(to stand decided)" once a court has established a principle of law 
applicable to a certain set facts, the same rule will be applied in the 
future to all cases involving substantially the same set of facts; see, State vs. 
392 South 600 East.. 886 P.2d 534. 
Under this test and based on the argument here in, the appellant submits that the decision made by 
the trial court should be reversed and all property returned to the appellant. 
POINT II 
"Did the trial court violate the Appellant fifth amendment Double Jeopardy Rights?". 
in concluding that the criminal action and the forfeiture action were separate proceedings, separate 
times, separate judges, but litigated the exact same facts. In the States', "MEMORANDUM IN 
SUPPORT OF SUMMARY AFFIRMANCE." The prosecution states that the appellant failed to 
preserve the issue he now raises on appeal, but in the contrary the appellant has submitted to the 
Utah Court of Appeal in form of official documents, transcripts of the court hearing dated back on 
September 13, 1995 with the honorable judge Sandra Peuler presiding. Attorney Clark Harms 
present on behalf of the State, turning the court's face on the appellant insertion of double 
jeopardy. It's a fact as the definition of contemporaneous objection, when considering that the 
defendant raise the double jeopardy issue by merely stating in the trial court, "Judge Peuler to 
proceed with this forfeiture proceeding today would violate my constitution rights ,when 
considering that I have already been convicted on the exact same facts that brings clause of 
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REM forfeiture in this court today, and to proceed in such would cause double jeopardy, being 
that the case has been closed ,and therefore bars any sequential charges",. Such statement 
would meet the scope of preservation to claim that the trial court manifested error, and that such 
errors are grounds for review by the court of appeal and, further states that to bring forth a second 
prosecution "in pursuant to" Utah Code Ann, 58-37-13(1) would violate ones "Constitutional Fifth 
Amendment." The seventh and ninth Circuits have concluded that civil forfeiture proceedings are 
separate from criminal proceedings. See, United States vs. Torres, 28 F.3d 1463,1465 (7th Cir.), 
Cert, denied. --U.S. - , 115 S. Ct. 669 (1994); United States vs S405.089.23 U.S. Currency. 33 
F. 3d 1210,1216 (9th Cir. 1994). In $405.089.23 U.S. Currency, the government was seeking not 
only criminal penalties against the appellant, but was also pursuing civil forfeiture remedies. The 
different actions were instituted at roughly the same time, but the forfeiture proceedings were before 
a different judge and were not concluded until over a year after the criminal convictions. 
Additionally, the forfeiture complaint was based on exactly the same offenses giving rise to 
the criminal prosecution, ff[T]he only difference government." 33 F.3d at 1216. This issue before 
the court was parallel to the issue before this court, whether the second proceeding was a violation 
of the, "appellants' fifth amendment Double Jeopardy rights." In concluding that the criminal action 
and the forfeiture action were separate proceeding for double jeopardy purposes, the court stated: 
"We fail to see how two separate actions, one civil and one criminal, instituted at 
different times, tried at different times, before different district judges, constitute the same 
"Proceeding." In ordinary legal parlance, such action are often proceedings only if they were 
brought in the same indictment and tired at the same time, characterized as "paralleled Proceeding," 
but not as the same "proceeding." 
A forfeiture case and a criminal prosecution would constitute the same 
Id. Moreover, although both proceedings resulted from the same violation of the law, the court 
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stated "We are not willing to white wash the double jeopardy violation in the case by affording 
Constitutional significance to the label of "single, coordinated Prosecution.1" Id. at 1217. See also 
Toreros, 28 F.3d at 1465 ("Two trials, even if close in time, is still double jeopardy, "); United 
States vs. Stanwood, 872 F. Supo 791 (D. or 1994); United States vs McCaslin. 863 F. Supp, 
1299 (W.D. Wash. 1994). United States vs Ursery. 59 F.3d 568,575 (6th Cir. 1996) Utah Code 
Ann. 58-37-13(9)(h)(1994). See also Utah Code Ann. 76-3-501 (6((h)(1994); 21 U.S.C.A. 881 
(West Supp. 1995). Conclusion of forsaid issue before the Utah Court Appeals see; State vs 
Wallace Davis.f f (For official Publication)" Case No. 940574-CA (September 1,1995). stop The 
only coinciding factor between, State vs. Wallace Davis, and the Appellant case are that the 
proceedings were reversed prosecutions order. The Utah State Court of Appeals "Conclusion"; 
"We hold that the concluded forfeiture action and the pending criminal 
proceeding are separate proceedings for Double Jeopardy purpose and that 
a forfeiture pursuant to section 58-37-13 constitutes punishment. By 
pursuing the criminal proceedings against defendant, the state is attempting topunish 
the defendant a second time for an offense for which he has already been punished, the very 
abuse that the Double Jeopardy clause protects against. Therefore, we conclude that the 
subsequent criminal proceeding is barred by the Double Jeopardy clause of the fifth amendment. 
Accordingly, the trial court's order denying defendant's motion to dismiss is reversed." 
It is clearly obvious that the purpose of the United State Constitution V Amendment, United 
States Constitution VIII Amendment, and the Utah Constitutional Amendment Article I, Section 
9, were constituted to protect the defendant from such constructive litigation by the prosecution of 
authorities, such as the ones here in this Brief of appeal and is the subject of the forsaid appeal for 
decision and review. 
SUMMARY OF CONCLUSION 
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The appellant turns to the [MULTIPLE PROSECUTION AND DOUBLE JEOPARDY]: 
Utah Code Ann. G.P. Part 4, 76-1 -401; "Single criminal episode ". defined - Joined of offenses 
and Defendants: In this part unless the context requires a different definition, "Single Criminal 
Episode" means all conduct which is closely related in time and is incident to an attempt or an 
accomplishment of a single criminal objective. [NJothing in this part shall be construed to limit or 
modify the effect of section; (77-21-31), in controlling the joiner of offenses and defendants in 
criminal proceedings. (1975) 76-1-402V Separate offenses arising out of single criminal episode -
include offenses (1). A defendant may be prosecuted in a single criminal episode; however, when 
the same act of a defendant under a single criminal episode shall establish offenses which may be 
punished in different ways under different provisions of this code, the act shall be punishable under 
[Ojnly one such provision; an acquittal or conviction and sentence under and such provision bars 
a prosecution under any other such provision. (2). Whenever conduct may establish separate 
offenses under a single criminal episode, unless the court otherwise orders to promote justice, a 
defendant [sjhall not be subject to separate trials for multiple offenses when: 
(a) The offenses are within the Jurisdiction of a single court, and 
(b) The offenses are known to the prosecution attorney at the time the defendant 
is arraigned on the first information or indictment. 
(3). A defendant maybe convicted of an offense included in the offenses charges [b]ut may not be 
convicted of both the offense charged and the included offense. An offense is so included when; 
(a) It is established by proof of the same or less than all the facts required to 
establish the commission of the offense charged; or 
(b) It constitutes an attempt, solicitation, conspiracy, or form or preparation to 
commit the offense charges or an offense otherwise included therein; or 
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© It is specifically designated by a statute as a lesser included offense. 
(4). The Court shall not be obligated to charge the jury with request to an included offense unless 
there is a rational basis for a verdict acquitting the defendant of the offense charged and convicting 
him of the included offense. 
(5). If the District court on motion after verdict or judgment, or an appeal court on appeal or 
certiorari, shall determine that there is insufficient evidence to support a conviction for the offense 
charged but that there is sufficient evidence to support a conviction for an included offense and the 
tries of fact necessarily found every fact required for conviction of that included offense, the verdict 
or judgment of conviction may be set aside or reversed and a judgment of conviction entered for the 
included offense; without necessity of a new trial, if such relief is sought by the defendant. 76-1-
403. Former prosecution barring subsequent prosecution for offense out of same episode. 
(1). If a defendant has been prosecuted for one or more offenses arising out of a single criminal 
episode, a subsequent prosecution for the same or a different offense arising out to the same criminal 
episode is barred if: 
(a) The subsequent prosecution is for an offense that was or should have been 
tried under subsection 76-1-402(2) in the former prosecution: and 
(b) The former prosecution; 
(I) resulted in acquittal; or 
(ii) resulted in conviction: or 
(iii) was improperly terminated; or 
(iv) was terminated by a final order or judgment for the defendant that has 
not been reversed, set aside, or vacated and that necessarily required 
a determination inconsistent with a fact that must be established to secure 
conviction in the subsequent prosecution. 
(2) There is an acquittal if the prosecution resulted in a finding of not guilty by the tried of fact in 
a determination that there was insufficient evidence to warrant conviction. A finding of lesser 
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include offense is an acquittal of a greater offense even though the conviction for the lesser included 
offense is subsequently reversed, set aside, or vacated. 
(3). There is a conviction if the prosecution resulted in a judgment of that has not been reverses, set 
aside, or vacated; a verdict of guilty that has not been reversed, set aside or vacated and that is 
capable of supporting a judgment; or plea of guilty accepted by the court. 
(4). There is an improper termination of prosecution of the termination takes place after a jury has 
been impaneled and sworn to try the defendant, or if the jury trial is waived, after the first witness 
is sworn. However, termination of prosecution is not improper if: 
(a) The defendant consent to the determination; or 
(b) The defendant waives his right to object to the termination; 
© The Court finds and state for the record that the termination is necessary 
because : 
(I) It is Physically impossible to proceed with the trial in conformity 
with the law; or 
(II) There is legal defect in the proceeding not attributable to the state 
that would make any judgment entered upon a verdict reversible 
as a matter of law; or 
(III) Prejudicial conduct in or out of the courtroom not attributable to 
the state makes the trial without injustice to the defendant or the 
state; or 
(IV) The jury is unable to agree upon a verdict; or 
(V) False statements of a juror on void dire prevent a fair trial. 
CONCLUSION 
In conclusion, based on the above argument, I, Frank Parker, acting through Pro Se Counsel 
express this appeal from the "Trial Court's" decision, based on a reasoned and studied professional 
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judgment that this appeal involves one or more questions of exceptional importance; (1). Did the 
"Trial Court" violate the excessive fines clause? and, (2). Did the "Trial Court" violate the 
double jeopardy clause? The appellant has submitted evidence that the double jeopardy issue was 
preserve in the trial court, and that this case itself is a sound case for review by the court of appeals 
and clearly reveals rational facts even with the limited research of the law. This is a case that is 
identical to the case; State vs. Wallace Davis for official publication; case NO#. 940574-CA in 
which the court of appeals reversed the lower court decision base upon the defendants' constitutional 
rights that protect one from double jeopardy, however, the order in which they were prosecuted is 
reverse order, but irrelevant to their identity and facts. It is acknowledging that all properties belong 
to the appellant, that were found in the proximity of the illegal activity could have been the subject 
of forfeiture if the prosecution attorney would have brought fore charges at the appropriate time 
which was at the time the appellant was being heard on the criminal episode, failure bars any 
sequential charges by law. Therefore the appellant asks the court of appeals to review the significant 
of the elements within this document of briefing present by the appellant under the following 
considerations that; the appellant is action through Pro Se counseling and studies of the law, the 
appellants feels that if such injustice prevails it would be arbitrary and would discredit the justice 
pertaining to quoted laws and statues within this briefing as well as violate ones constitutional rights, 
and would inflict unduly hardship upon the appellant. This is the sole and profound reason why the 
Utah Supreme Court has amended the scope of forfeiture, to protect one from such double jeopardy 
and have by law barred proceeding, that's pursued on this manner. 
It appears that the prosecution is attempting to inflame this issue by merely bringing up the 
appellants past criminal history, "(stating in one of their documents they have forwarded to the 
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courts and I)", that the appellant was under the supervision of parole doing the time he committed 
these violations. The appellant asks the court to over look such statements pertaining to the 
appellants past criminal history and to recognize that the state is attempting to inflict the appellant 
with double jeopardy by merely mentioning facts and evidence of crimes in which the appellant has 
already been adjudicated of. The appellant hereby prays that the court of appeals will reverse the 
"Forfeiture" of defendants' property ordered by the "Trial Court" on September 13,1995 before the 
Third District Court, Salt Lake County, the Honorable Sandra N. Peuler presiding. "(Property 
described in Appendix)" 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this / & day of October, 1995. 
FRANK PARKER / Appellant 
PRO SE COUNSEL 
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Frank Parker/Pro Se Counsel 
1388 Richard Street 
Salt Lake City, UT 84115 
Certificate of service 
I hereby certify that I caused to be mailed, postage prepaid, this iffi Of M ay, 1996, a true copy 
of the foregoing document. 
w^^ -— 
E. NEAL GUNARSON 
D.A. FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY 
CLARK A. HARMS, BAR #5713 
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Attorney for the Defendant 
231 East 400 South 
Suite 300 
Salt Lake C:r •', Utah 34111 
ii'd . *ud:-::.\l res t r ic t Court 
FRANK PARKER 
UTAH STATE PRISON 
P O BOX 250 
DRAPER, UT 84020 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIALDISTRICT COURT 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
FRANK PARKER * 
* NOTICE OF APPEAL #1 
APPELLANT * 
* CASE NO 950902803CV 
VS. * 
* JUDGE. SANDRA PEULER 
94-13659 MURRAY POLICE * 
DPARTMENT * 
APPELLEE * 
(1). NOTICE IS HERE BY GIVEN THAT APPELLANT, FRANK PARKER. 
THROUGH PRO SE COUNSEL, APPEALS, "THE FINAL JUDGMENT AND ORDER 
OF THE , HONORABLE SANDRA PEULER. 
ENTERED IN THIS MATTER BASED UPON ENTIRE JUDGMENT 
DATED THIS '^A day of October, 1995. 
FRANK PARKER/ APPELLANT 
PROSE 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN BEFORE ME THIS ? - ^ ~ DAY OF 
OCTOBER, 1995. . 
ADDENDUM F 
SflND-Y CIRCUIT COURT. ID:561-3857 JAN 12'95 14:04 N6.003 P.02 
iol IN THE<THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, SANDY DEPARTMENT Mb 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH •i, 
•STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
FRANK PARKER, 
Defendant. 
ORDER OF JUDGMENT, 
SENTENCE AM) COMMITMENT 
CASE NO; 951000026 FS 
JUDGE ROGER A. LIVINGSTON 
CLERK C. Hatch 
_DATE: 1-12-95 
The defendant being present and represented by Elizabeth A. Bowman and the State 
present and represented through Nick D'Alesandro, there being no legal reason why sentence 
should not be imposed, the defendant having been convicted by a plea of guilty to Count I as 
amended, UNLAWFUL POSSESSION OF A CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE, (cocaine) a felony 
of the third degree, 
IT IS ADJUDGED that the defendant is guilty as charged and convicted. 
IT IS ADJUDGED that (he defendant be confined and imprisoned at the Utah State Prison 
for an indeterminate period of 0 lo 5 years as provided by law for the crime of Unlawful 
Possession of Controlled Substance, concurrent with time now serving. Court recommends credit 
for time served from November 21, 1994. 
DATED this 12th day of January, 1995. 
ADDENDUM G 
DAVID E. YOCOM 
Salt Lake County Attorney 
RICHARD G. HAMP, Bar No. 4048 
Deputy County Attorney 
231 East 400 South, Suite 300 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 363-7900 
IN THE THIRD CIRCUIT COURT, SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
-vs-
FRANK PARKER, 
DOB 11/12/57 
OTN 7382773 
Defendant, 
Screened by: R. HAMP 
Assigned to: MAJOR DRUG 
BAIL: NO BAIL 
I N F O R M A T I O N 
Case No. 
The undersigned Det, Scott Hansen - Murray City Police 
Department, under oath states on information and belief that the 
defendant, committed the crime of: 
COUNT I 
UNLAWFUL POSSESSION OF A CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE W-ITM INTENTTO 
©TSTRiBy^HE, a S^ ccrnd^  Degree Felony, at 4811 SoutA State Street, 
in Salt Lake County, State of Utah, on or about November 21, 
1994 through November 22, 1994, in violation of Title 58, 
Chapter 37, Section 8(1) (a) (iv), Utah Code Annotated 1953, 
as amended, in that the defendant, FRANK PARKER, a party to 
the offense, did knowingly and intentionally have in his 
possession a controlled substance, to-wit: MeLliaiuphcLmuina, ^ -^ ^ 
a Schedule II Controlled Substance, with intent to 
distribute. 
NO BAIL REQUEST: The defendant FRANK PARKER is currently on 
Probation for another felony. Therefore, pursuant to Article I, 
Section 8, Utah Constitution, it is requested that the defendant 
be held without bail on the above charge. 
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THIS INFORMATION IS BASED ON EVIDENCE OBTAINEDv^ERQM THE FOLLOWING 
WITNESSES: 
Brandon Price, John Blanchard, Kimberlee Croft, Mike 
Faircloth, Terry Steed, Scott Hansen and State Criminalist. 
PROBABLE CAUSE STATEMENT: 
On November 21, 1994 through November 22, 1994, at 
approximately 11:30 p.m. at 4811 South State Street, in Salt Lake 
County, defendant was found to be in possession of 11-12 grams of 
suspected Methamphetamine which was in twenty separate baggies. 
The substance has been field tested and found to be 
Methamphetamine, a Schedule II Controlled Substance. 
DET. SCOTT HANSEN 
Affiant ' 
Subscribed and sworn to before 
me this ^7 _^&&Y of NoveiE^ ST, 
1994. 
W?IBTR3\TE£ 
t * - I 
Authorized for presentment anS filing:v 
DAVID E. YOCOM, County Attorne^. , 
Deputy County Attorney 
November 29, 1994 
msy/94 012138 
